FERNANDO CORTES VIA SHUTTERSTOCKFå alle våre nyheter og kommentarer i innboksen din kl. 06.00 ET.e-post

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program utvikler lasere som lager en skrikende ball av plasma på målet deres.

AV PATRICK TUCKERTEKNOLOGIREDAKTØR, DEFENSE ONE

28. JULI 2015

Tenk deg å gå gjennom et jorde på en skyfri dag når du plutselig hører 130 desibel brølet fra et jagerfly. Men du kan ikke oppdage strålen, eller til og med fortelle hvilken retning lyden kommer fra. Snarere ser det ut til at det stammer fra den tynne luften foran ansiktet ditt, som et rop fra en sint, gammeltestamentisk Gud. Nei, du hallusinerer ikke. Og du er ikke Moses. Du opplever en ny type militærvåpen som ikke er ment å drepe, men å skremme en fiende til retrett. Det kalles Laser-Induced Plasma Effect, eller LIPE, et våpen som det amerikanske militæret håper å begynne å teste i løpet av de kommende månedene.

LIPE er ideen til Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program , en gruppe som har i oppgave å finne opp bedre alternativer for publikumskontroll og sjekkpunktsikkerhet. Støyen kommer fra en unik manipulering av materie og energi for å produsere høye lyder på spesifikke målplasseringer, på en måte som et utrolig presist missil av støy. Slik fungerer det:

Materie kommer i fire tilstander: fast, flytende, gass og det som kalles plasma, den som er minst kjent for folk flest, selv om det faktisk er den vanligste materietilstanden i universet. Du kan tenke på det som gass pluss. I plasmatilstanden har høye doser energi trukket elektroner fra deres atomkjerner og skapt ioner. En haug av disse som henger ut er en tilstand av materie som ikke er flytende eller fast, og som heller ikke oppfører seg akkurat som en gass, men har magnetiske og elektriske egenskaper og kan ta form av lys (tenk neonlys, eller solen).

LIPEs lasere skyter ekstremt korte utbrudd (rundt et nanosekund, eller en milliarddels sekund) med rettet høy energi mot et mål. Dette målet kan være på en person, en frontrute eller bare et enkelt punkt i verdensrommet. Energien, relativt ufarlig på LIPE-nivåene, skiller elektroner og kjerner ved målområdet for å lage en blå ball av plasma. Ytterligere pulser med rettet laserenergi manipulerer ballen for å lage en lyd som ser ut til å komme fra ingensteds.

«Vi har demonstrert det i laboratoriet på svært korte avstander. Men vi har ikke klart å demonstrere det på engang 100 meter. Det er … neste skritt,” sa David Law, sjef for teknologidivisjonen ved JNLWD.

Den totale kostnaden vil være rundt $3 millioner, utbetalt i to $1,5 millioner småbedrifter-innovasjonsforskningskontrakter til Physical Optics Corp., som jobber med lyseffektene, og et Tucson-basert selskap kalt GEOST, som jobber med på lyden.

Alt dette kan høres banebrytende ut (i tillegg til høyt), men LIPE er ikke militærets første forsøk på å utnytte de unike egenskapene til plasmamaterie for å oppnå merkelige effekter. I 2002 forsøkte et JNLWD-program kalt Pulsed Energy Projectile å skape en lydeffekt som “bokstavelig talt kunne slå opprørere av beina”, rapporterte New Scientist for et tiår siden . Det var ment å bli utgitt i 2007; I stedet forsvant prosjektet. I 2004 testet marinen plasmas evner som rakettavleder i et initiativ kalt Plasma Point Defense , et annet prosjekt med mål langt utover det teknologien på den tiden kunne levere.

Slike tidlige plasmavåpen var tunge – mange veide mer enn 500 pund – og krevde enorm kraft for å levere svært begrensede effekter. Det begynte sakte å endre seg.

I 2005 jobbet et selskap kalt Stellar Photonics med et presisjonslydvåpen for JNLWD under en kontrakt på 2,7 millioner dollar som var en del av et program kalt Plasma Acoustic Sound System, eller PASS. I 2009 testet JNWLD det, med en viss suksess. Mye hadde forandret seg. “Det vi gjør med disse prototypene til dags dato er å slå dem av fra bare et vanlig bilbatteri. De tar ikke mye energi, men det er … veldig høy toppeffekt, som er det som får denne tingen til å fungere,” sa Law.

Det kortsiktige målet for PASS var en høy lydeffekt på en rekkevidde på 100 meter, veldig lik LIPE. Det LIPE lover er langt mer volum. “Gjeldende plasmaer oppnår kanskje 90 til 100 dB … vi prøver å komme til å være rundt 130 dB eller litt mer,” sa Law. Han sammenlignet forskjellen med en gressklipper versus et jagerfly. “Hver dB er en faktor på 10 ganger lydstyrken … Vi har jobbet med dette i biter og stykker siden 2009, men det har egentlig vært bare i løpet av de siste par årene at laserteknologien har modnet nok til å potensielt kunne få dette slags lyd ut,» sa Law.

Vil det ordne seg denne gangen? Verden vil vite snart nok. Laws mål er å teste på 100 meter de neste månedene og evaluere programmet i sin helhet innen mai neste år.

DELE DENNE:

NESTE HISTORIE: Hva er inne i justisdepartementets hemmelige nettsikkerhetsmemo?EKSKLUSIVInne I Hærens Nyeste Spionfly Amfibisk Krigsskip Skal Navngis Etter Fallujah-Kampene SPESIALRAPPORT”Broken Culture” Holder Tropper I Fare For Seksuelle Overgrep, Sier Talsmenn De Fysiske Hindringene For Pentagon's Connect-Everything Vision Air Force Avduker Ny B-21 Stealth Bomber Etter Syv År I Produksjon Defense One EBook: AUSA-Dekning

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., venstre, går med senator Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif. på Capitol Hill i Washington, 27. juni 2013. J. SCOTT APPLEWHITE/APFå alle våre nyheter og kommentarer i innboksen din kl. 06.00 ET.e-post

VITENSKAP OG TEKNOLOGI

Hva er inne i justisdepartementets hemmelige nettsikkerhetsmemo?

Til tross for oppfordringer om løslatelse, vil ikke regjeringen offentliggjøre et notat som senator Ron Wyden sier er avgjørende for Senatets truende cybersikkerhetsdebatt.

AV DUSTIN VOLZ

28. JULI 2015

Senator Ron Wyden har mange problemer med lovforslaget om nettsikkerhet som Senatet kan ta opp før pausen i august.

Men han kan bare snakke om noen av dem offentlig. Andre forbehold forblir strengt klassifisert.

Wyden, den demokratiske personvernhauken fra Oregon, hevder at en klassifisert juridisk uttalelse fra justisdepartementet skrevet i de første årene av George W. Bush-administrasjonen er relevant for overkammerets vurdering av nettlovgivning – en advarsel som minner nære observatører om hans hentydninger til National Security Agencys overvåkingsmakter år før de ble avslørt offentlig av Edward Snowden.

Obama-administrasjonen lover at den ikke stoler på notatet, som noen personverneksperter har spekulert i kan brukes i regi av nettsikkerhet for å tillate myndighetenes overvåking av amerikanernes internettbruk. Talsmenn for Wyden og borgerlige friheter er bekymret for at notatet kan bli påberopt av en fremtidig president, en bekymring som delvis er drevet av bruken av andre juridiske meninger fra Bush-tiden skrevet for å rettferdiggjøre garantiløs overvåking og CIAs såkalte “forbedrede avhørsteknikker” under krigen mot terror.

Wyden has railed against the information-sharing legislation passed out of the Senate Intelligence Committee as a “surveillance bill by another name.” While its boosters say it could help minimize the damage wrought by hacks like those that crippled Sony Pictures or laid bare the Office of Personnel Management's records of federal employees, Wyden insists that the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, or CISA, is overly broad and that evidence is thin that it would improve cybersecurity.

(See also: The War On Terrorists' Tweets)

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has indicated that he hopes to move CISA, which would provide expanded legal protection to companies that voluntarily share “cyberthreat indicators” with the government and each other, within the next two weeks, likely after Congress wraps up debate over highway funding. While government officials say they no longer rely on the memo, Wyden continues to press for its declassification in order to ensure that future administrations don't reverse course.

I believe it will be difficult for Congress to have a fully informed debate on cybersecurity legislation if it does not understand how these agreements have been interpreted by the Executive Branch.

SEN. RON WYDEN, D-ORE.

“I remain very concerned that a secret Justice Department opinion that is of clear relevance to this debate continues to be withheld from the public,” Wyden said in his written dissent against CISA, which cleared the Senate Intelligence Committee 14-1 in March. “This opinion, which interprets common commercial service agreements, is inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law, and I believe it will be difficult for Congress to have a fully informed debate on cybersecurity legislation if it does not understand how these agreements have been interpreted by the Executive Branch.”

Last month, when McConnell tried and failed to pass CISA by attaching it to a defense authorization bill—a procedural trick that limited amendments and prompted a Democratic backlash, Wyden urged his colleagues to read the memo in question. Any senator that voted for the bill, he said, “is voting without a full understanding of the relevant legal landscape.”

The Justice Department would not comment on the contents of the opinion other than to say that it is “aware of the senator's concerns and [has] provided a response.” That response is classified, Wyden's office confirmed, adding that DOJ officials indicated they had no plans to release the legal memo publicly.

Privacy advocates say that refusal is unsettling, in part because the opinion was written by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2003—a date revealed in congressional testimony a decade later and first highlighted by independent journalist Marcy Wheeler. At that time, the same group of lawyers working in the Bush administration also was writing secret memos that justified warrantless wiretapping by the National Security Agency and the creation of the CIA's foreign black sites, where suspected terrorists were detained and subjected to brutal interrogation methods such as waterboarding and sensory deprivation.

“Torture and mass surveillance are our experiences with secret law,” said Nathan White, senior legislative manager with the digital rights group Access, which Monday joined other privacy advocates to launch a “week of action,” lobbying senators to vote down CISA.

White, in addition to several other civil-liberties activists, said he did not know specifically what the Justice Department memo could be referring to. But these memos can be significant, he added, noting that two other secret Justice Department memos from 2012 first published in June by The New York Times and ProPublica revealed that the NSA had expanded the breadth of its surveillance to include the cross-border Internet traffic of Americans, in an apparent attempt to uncover and monitor foreign hackers.

“Wyden is not a sky-is-falling kind of guy,” White said. “He is very clear and targeted when he is warning about stuff.”

The oblique warning from Wyden is reminiscent of insinuations that he and former Sen. Mark Udall made about NSA surveillance prior to the Snowden disclosures that began two years ago. Both Democratic lawmakers sat on the Senate Intelligence Committee and expressed grave concerns about the NSA's bulk collection of U.S. phone records, but said they were restricted in their ability to reveal classified information.

“The American people will also be extremely surprised when they learn how the Patriot Act is secretly being interpreted,” Wyden said during a floor speech in 2011, more than two years before the Snowden disclosures, which revealed that a provision of the law known as Section 215 was being used to justify the NSA's dragnet phone surveillance. “And I believe one consequence will be an erosion of public confidence that makes it more difficult for our critically important national intelligence agencies to function effectively.”

Udall's defeat to Republican challenger Cory Gardner last year has often left Wyden as the solitary voice of dissent on the Intelligence panel, though he is occasionally joined by Sen. Martin Heinrich, a New Mexico Democrat, on pressing for more privacy protections. On CISA, and on the Justice Department memo specifically, Wyden has been on a largely lonely crusade. Two similar info-sharing bills easily passed the House this year, and in the shadow of massive hacks on private companies and government, final passage appears more likely than in previous Congresses.

Wyden, for his part, remains undeterred. Over the past several years, he sent letters to former Attorney General Eric Holder expressing his concern that the memo remains classified. In a rare open Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in December 2013, Wyden peppered Caroline Krass, then the nominee for CIA general counsel, with questions about the legal opinion, extracting an assurance that she would not invoke it during her tenure due to its age. She also said the memo was issued as a “first impression” on a then-novel technology in 2003 and that case law has evolved since.

Wyden said those promises were insufficient, however. “What concerns me is, unless the opinion is withdrawn, someone else might be tempted to reach the opposite conclusion,” he said at the hearing.

An Unexpected Voice Speaks Out Against Backdoored Encryption

Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff joins the league of technologists who have come out against the FBI's push to put holes in privacy technology.

BY KEDAR PAVGI

JULY 27, 2015

ASPEN, Colo. — As top national-security officials continued to argue that U.S. companies should build government-only backdoors into encrypted devices and services, an unexpected voice rose in opposition.

“I think that it's a mistake to require companies that are making hardware and software to build a duplicate key or a backdoor, even if you hedge it with the notion that there's going to be a court order,” former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told an audience at the 2015 Aspen Security Forum.

Chertoff said weakening encryption would increase the vulnerabilities for ordinary users, force “bad people” into using technology that would be even harder to decrypt, and could become a strategic vulnerability for the United States, especially if Russia and China demanded backdoor access.

But the Aspen gathering also saw other top officials continue their campaign to require such backdoors. FBI Director James Comey, NSA Director Adm. Mike Rogers and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper all argued that sophisticated commercial encryption hampers U.S. intelligence efforts against militants like ISIS. Even judicially authorized communications would face a technological barrier in the form of end-to-end encryption, they told audiences.

“There's two values in conflict,” Comey said Wednesday. “All of us believe in safety and security on the internet, hugely important to protecting all of us. All of believe in public safety. Those two values are coming into tension.” Earlier this month, Comey warned the Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees that the lack of a backdoor could lead to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

Rogers concurred with Comey's sentiments. In response to an audience question during a Thursday session, he said that commercial-level encryption presented a “significant challenge” to his agency's intelligence efforts. He said that terrorist groups use encrypted communications to spread messages and coordinate supporters. “We've watched terrorist groups around the world focused on that,” Rogers said.

Comey and Rogers described the debate as a question more of values than technology. Both officials said society would need to figure out how to balance the threat from extremist groups with the need for secure communications. Ultimately, they said, tech companies would have to figure out how to mitigate the national-security threat posed by encryption.

At least one observer viewed Chertoff's statements through a cui bono lens. Marcy Wheeler, who first noted the former DHS chief's remarks on her personal site, wrote that he might have spoken out “because as a contractor he's being paid to voice the opinions of the tech industry.”

“Nevertheless, it's not just hippies and hackers making these arguments,” Wheeler added. “It's also someone who, for most of his career, pursued and prosecuted the same kinds of people that Jim Comey is today.”

Technology executives, workers, and researchers have generally come out against weakened encryption . in February, a Yahoo executive confronted Rogers personally:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=jJZNvEPyjlw%3Fwmode%3Dtransparent

Earlier this month, a group of respected security researchers and technologists “concluded that the American and British governments cannot demand special access to encrypted communications without putting the world's most confidential data and critical infrastructure in danger,” the New York Times reported .

“We have found that the damage that could be caused by law enforcement exceptional access requirements would be even greater today than it would have been 20 years ago,” the authors wrote in their report , published by MIT. “In the wake of the growing economic and social cost of the fundamental insecurity of today's Internet environment, any proposals that alter the security dynamics online should be approached with caution.”

Other commentators have noted that weakened encryption could inadvertently harm human rights workers and activists abroad .